Who Were the Sea Peoples?

As Claes Ryn has demonstrated, moral sentimentality increasingly has displaced moral realism in Western culture. We have always had moral education, and it has always taught people not to do bad things. But moral realism recognizes that evil is real, and that, whatever they are taught , some people embrace evil anyway, and so will do bad, indeed very, very bad, things. Furthermore, recognizing this, it is sensible to take steps to guard against such evil people. Moral sentimentality, on the other hand, believes that evil can somehow be wished away if we all just adopt the right sentiments . Murder must exist only because we have somehow promoted a "murder culture." And anyone who advises unarmed people not to wander around in dark alleys in dangerous neighborhoods late at night must be "blaming the victim" of murder for their own death! We have been teaching people not to murder since at least the code of Hammurabi, and probably even way before that. Hitler, wh...

The NY Daily News today has an op-ed claiming that the poll showing New Yorkers do not object to their police force spying on Muslims in New Jersey demonstrates that there is nothing wrong with the practice! And since 8 out 10 think that cops have been effective in fighting terror, that makes it "indisputable" that they have been!

Hereabouts I have caught wind of the opinion that belief in an objective moral reality can make people intolerant. (Note: that would not prove there is no objective morality. It might argue for hushing up its existence, however.) Here are some reasons why this need not be the case. (You will note some overlap here with the recent abortion post: I was thinking about these things together, in fact.) 1) Good people often make bad decisions: we are all sinners! If I want my sins forgiven, I ought to show similar tolerance for others. 2) The fact that one believes that there is an objective moral reality does not mean one thinks one has unique, infallible access to that reality. I suspect that what some people who get upset about an assertion of moral realism are really upset about is the idea that if someone thinks there is a moral reality, and that s / he has it perfectly mapped out, that person can become extremely intolerant. But one can be a moral realist while being humble abou...

My post the other day drew all sorts of ire from feminists who said I was "equating" women's sexual freedom with serial killing. This, of course, was nonsense: when you execute a reductio, you are not "equating" the absurd thing with your opponent's case at all. But what's more, my post had nothing to do with feminism or sexual freedom. Rather, I was struck by Carmon's claim that we each get to define our own morality. I thought this was a terrible mistake, and that there was, in fact, a much better way for her to put her own feminist claims. While I was sipping my cappuccino today, I was thinking about all the distraction the feminist issue caused from what I was actually discussing, which was moral realism. So let's look at this issue again, and take up freedom of religion, instead. Consider infant circumcision, something that is a standard practice in Judaism. Here are a range of things one might think about this: 1) The practice is, ...

Moral realism means that one thinks moral questions have real answers to them, not just answers we make up, and that it is either true or false to say "X is wrong," and not merely a statement of one's own preferences. Before they get muddled by philosophy, almost everyone is a moral realist. And in practice, even after having had their common sense stunted in Ethics 101, most people continue to be moral realists: if their kid punches another kid in the head on the playground, they don't say, "Now Johnny, in my personally defined moral code, that was wrong." No, they say "That was wrong." Now, there are a couple of things moral realism doesn't imply, but that, given the comments I have received, people seem to believe it does imply. * Being a moral realist does not mean that one thinks one infallibly knows right from wrong. I believe the physical world is objectively real, and not just a matter of what I define it to be, but that certainl...

Nihilism is really the right conclusion to draw from moral irrealism. But if you push most moral subjectivists, you will find that they don't really believe what they claim. For instance, test someone who says, "We each define our own morality" by saying, "OK, then it would be fine for me, if I could get the votes, to pass a law making any non-procreative sex a capital crime?" "WHAT?! You don't get to enforce your morality on me!" "Why not? In the morality I defined for myself , it is perfectly OK for me to do so." "But, but..." What they really meant is that they think some things traditionally morally prescribed (such as, say, pre-marital sex) aren't really morally wrong at all. But since they have failed to convince everyone of this, they say, "Hey, you get your morality, and I get mine." But they clearly think it is objectively wrong for someone to outlaw the sexual practices they enjoy.

When Irin Carmon declares that we each have the right to define our own moral boundaries, she will prove a point that is quite opposite to the one she wishes to prove. Here is what I suggest she really wanted to say: 1) There is nothing objectively morally wrong about adults having whatever forms of consensual sex with each other that they wish to have; and 2) It is objectively wrong for anyone else to try to control those sexual activities through force, including legally mandated force. By instead claiming that we each get to define our own morality, she permits, of course, Rick Santorum to define his own morality as well. And in his self-defined morality, both 1) and 2) are false. So if Santorum can get a law passed outlawing homosexual activity, what can the moral-subjectivist Carmon say to him? "I think that is wrong!" Santorum merely replies, "I don't! And right now, I've got the votes." Surely, Carmon thinks that Santorum would be wrong ...