I am currently reading The Master and His Emissary , which appears to be an excellent book. ("Appears" because I don't know the neuroscience literature well enough to say for sure, yet.) But then on page 186 I find: "Asking cognition, however, to give a perspective on the relationship between cognition and affect is like asking astronomer in the pre-Galilean geocentric world, whether, in his opinion, the sun moves round the earth of the earth around the sun. To ask a question alone would be enough to label one as mad." OK, this is garbage. First of all, it should be pre-Copernican, not pre-Galilean. But much worse is that people have seriously been considering heliocentrism for many centuries before Copernicus. Aristarchus had proposed a heliocentric model in the 4th-century BC. It had generally been considered wrong, but not "mad." (And wrong for scientific reasons: Why, for instance, did we not observe stellar parallax?) And when Copernicus propose
My Review of the Review
ReplyDeleteWhat I look for in a book review are simple things, such as, after reading the review, do I have a good sense of what the book is about.
Second, if the reviewer has objections to certain positions in the book, do I get the sense that the reviewer has clearly and fairly explained the position of the author, and has the reviewer then clearly and fairly explained his objections.
Gene Callahan has succeeded on all counts. In fact, his review could be a model for college students on how to write a review.
Thank you very much!
ReplyDeleteThanks for bringing Caplan`s book to our attention.
ReplyDeleteThe most probable outcome of the “miracle of aggregation” is a government run by well-connected rent seekers. Are not those who stand to gain the most personally from political decisions—such as recipients of state subsidies, government contractors, lobbyists, and so forth— precisely those who have the greatest incentive to become informed about what is at stake in any election? The most probable outcome of the “miracle of aggregation” is a government run by well-connected rent seekers.
I agree with you strongly here, so I`m puzzled that you seem to have left your most important insight for last.
Instead, we get a lengthy digression into why Caplan is wrong to call some voter behavior rational, when it should be rather clear that voters, being human, are not machines and so are swayed by appeals to emotion and tribal identity - appeals that can easily be seen over the past decade, from both rent-seekers and from politicians seeking support for policies that cater to special interests while pandering to voters` emotions.
Caplan’s findings are perfectly compatible with the thesis that we are witnessing such a situation at present [viz., a body of experts is clinging to an erroneous dogma long after outsiders noted its flaws] and that indoctrination into the economic way of thinking—a factor for which Caplan, given the question he sought to answer, inherently could not control—is itself the problem.
This seems a little opaque and worth further explication. Did you intend readers to infer a criticism of Keynesianism in favor of Austrian economics? If so, why not state so explicitly and explain why?
"I agree with you strongly here, so I`m puzzled that you seem to have left your most important insight for last."
ReplyDeleteI didn't think this was what was most important in my review!
"Instead, we get a lengthy digression into why Caplan is wrong to call some voter behavior rational..."
Did you mean irrational? In any case, this was what I found most important! I think it is far more important to show the arbitrary nature of this materialist, anti-spiritual view of what is "rational" than to make some point on rent seeking.
"This seems a little opaque and worth further explication. Did you intend readers to infer a criticism of Keynesianism in favor of Austrian economics?"
No -- a critique of economic imperialism.
Gene,
ReplyDeleteGood review. Unlike TT, I thought the rationality issue was paramount; it made it into the book's title, after all.
Indeed, even in your opening when you were explaining Caplan's thesis, I wondered, "What the heck is the difference?"
Some Austrians were mad at (what they claimed was) unfair swipes in the book. True or not?
Gene Callahan has succeeded on all counts. In fact, his review could be a model for college students on how to write a review.
ReplyDeleteExcept I would add, "Now kids, when you are writing a review exceeding 2,000 words, you should probably at least quote one full sentence from the book to give the reader an idea of how the author writes."
Gene, are you disagreeing with Caplan's general point that voters may act irrationally (with“rational irrationality”), or simply arguing that his categorization scheme as to what looks rational or irrational is leaky (which seems to be a much more narrow criticism)?
ReplyDeleteWhile I would agree that people may very well rationally come to very different preferences on political issues, it seems clear to me that much behavior is NOT rationally thought out, but reflects unconscious biases and predilections.
Why is a bias not preference, and why is it irrational?
ReplyDeleteI think the main point of Callahan's book was that the 'quality' of the decisions tend to be lower, although people ultimately do bear the results of their decisions (collectively).
ReplyDeleteIt seems to me that the point was that it is rational to act in a way that would seem irrational if your action really 'made difference'.
I use it often as an argument against the people who claim that democratic decisions are somehow superior to market decisions. I do agree though that saying 'it is rational to act irrationally' suggests that the definition of 'rationality' cannot be defined identically in both parts of this sentence and Callahan should probably have used different word.
This is why I'm planning on giving up blogging -- the book I'm critiquing is now attributed to me!
ReplyDeleteThis is why I'm planning on giving up blogging -- the book I'm critiquing is now attributed to me!
ReplyDeleteIt wasn't worth Ondrej's time to learn the author's true identity.
But at least Ondrej is being earnest. Have you forgotten the importance of being earnest? ;)
ReplyDeleteWhy is a bias not preference, and why is it irrational?
ReplyDeletescineram, I am trying to draw a distinction between what is thought-out (reasoned and therefor literally "rational") and what is subconcious (and arational). In principle the two can be distinguished, even if in practice it remains difficult.
Your question illustrates that one problem for us non-philosopher, non-economist doofuses here is making sure we even remotely understand what guys like Caplan and Callahan have in mind when they are discussing what is "rational" or "irrational", as even the most perspicicaious dialogue often involves technical terms.
Out of pure curiosity, would you draw any practical conclusions from your argument that (liberal) democracy is in principle even worse a system than Caplan argues it to be? (I put 'liberal' in brackets because it's unclear from your review whether it's democracy as such that is in question or actually-existing liberal democracy specifically.)
ReplyDeleteOops..sorry :) I did read the book but somehow both your names start with 'C'....you know, all the Japanese look the same to me and English names as well ;-)
ReplyDeleteWhen I decide to solve a mathematical question simply by writing a random number, I would say that I didn't come to the solution 'rationally' compared to analytical solution. However you would probably claim that I did act rationally, because I e.g. decided to save time and write the random number instead. I don't know, it doesn't seem to me to weaken Caplan's claim that much..
'Out of pure curiosity, would you draw any practical conclusions from your argument that (liberal) democracy is in principle even worse a system than Caplan argues it to be?'
ReplyDeleteWell, Caplan thinks the miracle of aggregation fails due to system voter biases, so I'm not really sure whether it's worse for it to fail that way or in the way I suggest.
'Well, Caplan thinks the miracle of aggregation fails due to system voter biases, so I'm not really sure whether it's worse for it to fail that way or in the way I suggest.'
ReplyDeleteOK. The whole talk of 'democracy' just seems a bit abstract to me when the subject is its specific failings. For example, your criticism would seem particularly appropriate to the US, with all the political appointments the president makes, but much less so to other countries. (Indeed, even speaking of 'political appointments' is too vague - thus, the British Prime Minister is the person who ultimately decides who the next Archbishop of Canterbury is, but this doesn't lead to any given head of the Anglican Communion being thought a 'Labour' or a 'Conservative' appointee. OK, it's not an open choice for the PM, but he or she could hypothetically engineer a 'political' appointment in the American sense.)
Yes, I'm reviewing a book with a very abstract view of politics, so I'm playing the game on Caplan's terms. As a good Collingwoodian, I'll freely admit this leaves much of importance out.
ReplyDelete'Yes, I'm reviewing a book with a very abstract view of politics, so I'm playing the game on Caplan's terms.'
ReplyDeleteNothing wrong with 'abstract views' per se of course, though as a good Oakeshottian, I'll endeavour to remind you of this if I ever see you appealing to Oakeshott's notion of 'rationalism', or indeed, dictates on theory and practice more generally...
Thanks for your review. One major issue with Caplan's book that you picked up on is that he fails to prove that people are behaving dogmatically and aren't just ignorant of the arguements against their positions. The evidence he uses only shows that there is a difference between the opinions of economists and the opinion of the general public, not that the general public is more dogmatic. He doesn't provide any studies or any other proof shows that when random members of the general public are presented with overwhelming proof and reasoning against their beliefs, they still choose to cling onto their old beliefs like a flat earther refusing to believe the earth is round no matter how much contrarian evidence is put in front of them. An even bigger problem for Caplan is that his theory still fails to solve the paradox of voting. If people are smart enough to relize that there votes don't statistically matter and they won't suffer any consequences if they choose to indulge in socially injurious beliefs, then why would they bother voting in the first place and not just free ride off of others voting for the candatates/policies they prefer? However, people clearly vote in large numbers in the real world and candates do win. Caplan's never solves this paradox in his book but he does attempt to patch it up in a later debate with Jeffrey Friedman by claiming that voting is a form of consumption the same way fans cheer at their favorite teams despite their individual cheering having a negligible effect on the performance of their team. The act itself is pleasurable so voters/cheerers can't just freeride off others and must commit the act themselves to feel the pleasure. However, as a person who has cheered at countless sports events, Caplan's explanation comes up too short. When I cheer for a team, I don't feel good just because I cheered at my favorite team. No, I feel good because I felt like my cheering contributed to a potential boost of my favorite teams performance, even if statistically speaking, my cheering affected the performance of my team by a negligible amount. Similiary, every person I talked to who gave up voting did so not because they no longer felt like voting was pleasurable but because they genuinly thought that their votes didn't matter. Not in the sense that their votes were statistically unlikely to affect the outcome of an election but that any politician they voted for would fail to deliver on their promises or were completely dishonest. Even if Caplan's thesis were true, it doesn't follow that the best solution would be disinfranchise the populus and abolish the state to instate Anarcho Capitalism or that a good half measure would be to give epistocrats like economists enourmous political power to override the populus whenever they saw fit. All of those have their own issues that could still make constitutional democracy a better option even if Caplan was correct.
ReplyDelete