More predator-prey business cycle theory
Again from this paper:
"Information asymmetry among the economic players generates an incentive for non-cooperative strategies. Specifically, we assume that the producers’ control on the means of production of the companies allow them to extract rents from them at the expense of the sector of investors that do not enjoy such control (the creditors), who in turn impose limits on this “predatory activity” by subjecting the corporate leadership through creditor controls, resulting in dynamic process analogue to the classical Lotka-Volterra Predator-Prey model."
"Information asymmetry among the economic players generates an incentive for non-cooperative strategies. Specifically, we assume that the producers’ control on the means of production of the companies allow them to extract rents from them at the expense of the sector of investors that do not enjoy such control (the creditors), who in turn impose limits on this “predatory activity” by subjecting the corporate leadership through creditor controls, resulting in dynamic process analogue to the classical Lotka-Volterra Predator-Prey model."
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