He set me the task, in the comments of another post, of correcting all of the Amazon reviews that say "Fukuyama has written a [good / bad] work of history."
Good point. My aim was not to enter upon interminable terminological debates. So let me re-phrase: There are two different types of studies: History
1 and History
2. History
1 is a very disciplined, precise "science" (in the sense of a German
wissenschaft) and achieves results as reliable as do physics and chemistry -- that is to say, always open to revision upon new evidence, but broadly accepted by all of the experts in the field as being the best answer available at present. Here is an example: Herodotus reported that the size of the Persian invasion force attacking Greece was 2.5 million men. If the naive view of history were correct, here we would have a simple "fact" of history, and historians would then go about interpreting it. But that is not what History
1 practitioners do. Instead, they treat the words of Herodotus not as a fact, but as
evidence. "Hmm, Herodotus thought there were that many Persians... why?" Looking at such testimony, as well as archaeological evidence, populations estimates, etc. etc., historians of type 1 have concluded that Herodotus's figure is greatly exaggerated:
the real number is more like 200,000. This is a finding that is agreed upon by Marxist historians, feminist historians, libertarian historians, and so on, so long as they are all competent "technical historians" (Butterfield's term). Someone may say, "Well, of course, they agree on the facts, but not their interpretation," but that ignores my point that this "fact" is not a given with which one starts historical research: it is the
conclusion of an historical study. And that is the sense in which I stake my claim that history is as precise as any other well-developed
wissenschaft -- skilled practitioners can reach consensus on facts such as this.
Now, let me grant that there is something else typically called "history," which consists in grand speculation about the broad patterns that may or may not be exhibited in the findings of History
1. I will permit everyone to continue to call it "history" -- you may thank me later. But I will designate it as History
2. History
2 is what Fukuyama does. History
2 is what Marx (usually) did. History
2 is what Jared Diamond does. History
2 is what Pinker does. And History
2, I will grant, is extremely speculative, and the conclusions of its practitioners generally achieve a very low degree of consensus.
So let us call them both history. But do not confuse the vague results achieved by History
2with the remarkable achievements in determining what really happened in the past achieved by History
1.