Over at Rod Dreher's blog, one "Prof. Woland" explains why he doesn't believe in God:
“because my epistemological stance towards the world asks for kinds of evidence that don’t really work with supernatural entities”
What he means is that he will only accept as evidence the kind of things offered as evidence in, say, physics. Well, of course, since the God of philosophical theism is not a physical entity, not an item in the world, the kind of evidence physics uses will by definition "not really work with him." It as though one asked for physical proof of the fundamental theorem of calculus or the existence of justice. Perhaps those things don't exist, but asking for physical evidence of their existence, e.g. "Show me them scattering x-rays or attracting a mass," simply illustrates that you are confused and have no idea what you are talking about. And if you simply declare that only the things physics can detect are real, well, you are not basing that conclusion on any non-question-begging evidence, but simply declaring an a priori metaphysical belief.
“I don’t believe in pink things!”
“I only accept things that aren’t pink as evidence, and so I’ve seen no evidence of pink things.”
NOTE: And please, please, don't be so tedious as to come back with, "Well, the fact that we use the fundamental theorem of calculus in physics is good physical evidence for it!" That is just the sort of evidence we have for God, and not at all the sort we have for x-rays.